| Criminal law |
|---|
| Part of the common law series |
| Element (criminal law) |
| Actus reus · Mens rea Causation · Concurrence |
| Scope of criminal liability |
| Complicity · Corporate · Vicarious |
| Inchoate offenses |
| Attempt · Conspiracy · Solicitation |
| Offence against the person |
|
Assault · Battery |
| Crimes against property |
| Arson · Blackmail · Burglary Embezzlement · Extortion False pretenses · Larceny Possessing stolen property Robbery · Theft |
| Crimes against justice |
| Compounding · Misprision Obstruction · Perjury Malfeasance in office Perverting the course of justice |
| Defenses to liability |
| Defense of self Defence of property Consent · Diminished responsibility Duress · Entrapment Ignorantia juris non excusat Infancy · Insanity Intoxication defense Justification · Mistake (of law) Necessity · Loss of Control (Provocation) |
| Other common law areas |
| Contracts · Evidence · Property Torts · Wills, trusts and estates |
| Portals |
| Criminal justice · Law |
Willful blindness (sometimes called ignorance of law, willful ignorance or contrived ignorance or Nelsonian knowledge) is a term used in law to when an individual seeks to avoid civil or criminal liability for a wrongful act by intentionally putting himself in a position where he will be unaware of facts which would render him liable.
For example, in a number of cases, persons transporting packages containing illegal drugs have asserted that they never asked what the contents of the packages were and so lacked the requisite intent to break the law.
Such defences have not succeeded, as courts have been quick to determine that the defendant should have known what was in the package and exercised criminal recklessness by failing to find out.
A famous example of such a defence being denied occurred in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), in which the defendants argued that the file-swapping technology was designed in such a way that they had no way of monitoring the content of swapped files. They suggested that their inability to monitor the activities of users meant that they could not be contributing to copyright infringement by the users. The court held that this was willful blindness on the defendant's part and would not constitute a defence to a claim of contributory infringement.